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New Directions 
in the Philosophy 
of Mind 
The philosophy of mind in the last few 
decades has been preoccupied with  
the question of physicalism: whether  
the mind is physical or material. But 
although many philosophers seem to 
accept some form of physicalism, there  
is little consensus on exactly which form 
of the view is true, on why it is true, and 
even on what it means for something to 
be physical. 
Now with the assistance of a grant  
from the John Templeton Foundation, 
whose aim is to support research on the 
‘Big Questions’, Professor Tim Crane will  
be leading a major research initiative to 
investigate non-physicalist and non-
reductionist views of the mind. 
The project will be based in  
Cambridge from July 2015 to July 2017, 
and an international group of young 
philosophers of mind will join Professor 
Crane as the project’s researchers: Craig 
French, currently a research fellow at 
Trinity Hall, Alex Grzankowski from Texas, 
Raamy Majeed from Sydney and Chris 
Meyns from UCL. The group will meet  
for a weekly seminar which will run for 
two whole academic years. There will  
be two invitations to submit research 
proposals, inviting philosophers, 
psychologists and neuroscientists from 
anywhere in the world to apply for 
smaller grants from the Cambridge  
New Directions Project, to support 
research activities related to the project’s 
themes. The project will conclude with a 
major international and interdisciplinary 
conference in 2017, provisionally entitled 
‘The Human Mind Conference’. Watch 
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Greetings from a new Chair, though a 
temporary one. Tim Crane has had a 
well-earned sabbatical this year, but the 
interregnum is brief. He will be back in 
position next year, whilst also directing a 
large Templeton project, ‘New Directions in 
the Philosophy of Mind’. Huw Price has major 
Templeton funding as well for the Centre 
for the Study of Existential Risk. Together 
these two projects will bring in a number 
of new post-docs and lecturers. Add to this 
other new appointments, to replace staff 
who have secured research leave, and an 
unprecedented influx of Junior Research 
Fellows (seven at the last count), and the 
Faculty will be buzzing next year.
Before that though, we have a busy 
summer with many visitors. Heading the list, 
Judith Jarvis Thomson will be in Cambridge 
in May, not just to give the Routledge lecture, 
but also to receive an honorary doctorate. She 
will join the august company of W. V. O. Quine, 
Jurgen Habermas, Bernard Williams, Mary 
Hesse, and − more controversially! − Jacques 
Derrida. There has been no controversy 
surrounding Thomson’s degree. She is one of 
Cambridge’s most distinguished philosophy 
graduates, having been at Newnham in the 
early 1950s, supervised by John Wisdom. Her 
last visit in 2013 was a tremendous success. 
The first-year undergraduates in one of their 
first ethics lectures were amazed to find 
themselves being addressed by Thomson, 
of trolley problem fame, in characteristically 
combative mood.
We saw a number of potential new 
undergraduates at our first sixth-form 
philosophy conference in March. One 
hundred very enthusiastic sixth-formers 
arrived to hear talks on free speech, free 
will and partial belief. Over lunch, their 
teachers attended a session to discuss what 
the Faculty can do to help with sixth-form 
philosophy teaching: web resources and 
seminars for teachers are in the works. 
Philosophy applications have not seen 
the decline that has hit many humanities 
subjects, but we should do what we can to 
ensure that the next generation realize the 
appeal of studying philosophy at Cambridge.
Rae Langton giving a talk at the first Cambridge Sixth Form  Photo: S. Siriwardena 
Philosophy conference. 
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 “I’ll pay you, you know, 50,000 dollars, 
100,000 dollars… whatever you 
want… I’m a man of my word.”
A UBS investment banker and ‘man of 
his word’ is caught trying to bribe a 
broker. Taken from an incriminating email 
uncovered after the Libor-fixing scandal − 
when traders illegally manipulated London 
interest rates – the sentence illustrates a 
climate that has a global sector reeling.
Even before news of the scandal broke, 
PR giant Edelman’s annual Trust Barometer 
was reporting that public trust in banks had 
fallen off a cliff, concluding that banking is 
the “most distrusted global industry.”
People need money. Once they have  
it, they need to know it’s safe. So people 
need to trust banks, and banks need  
people to trust them. If that trust ebbs,  
the system becomes dangerously unstable. 
For two philosophers, the current lack of 
trust sits like a time bomb at the heart of 
global capitalism.
“One should start by distinguishing 
trust from trustworthiness. Trust isn’t 
always valuable, since it may be badly 
placed. It would be foolish and foolhardy 
to trust banks when they don’t merit it. 
Trustworthiness comes first,” said Alex Oliver, 
Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge. With 
Professor Boudewijn de Bruin Professor 
of Financial Ethics at the University of 
Groningen, he is co-leading a €1 million, 
five-year project on Trusting Banks, funded 
by the Dutch Research Council.
The mid-1980s deregulations were  
based on the idea that banks have a 
strong, self-interested reason to behave 
scrupulously. If they do not, so the 
reasoning goes, they will be found out,  
their reputations will suffer and trust will be 
lost, leading to competitive disadvantage. 
But this market-based deterrent mechanism 
has comprehensively failed: witness Bernie 
Madoff’s Ponzi investment scheme – 
described as the largest financial fraud in 
US history – the manipulation of markets, 
money laundering, mis-selling of payment 
protection insurance and interest rate swaps, 
flawed credit ratings and the subprime 
mortgage crisis. Where will it end?
As those at the top of the sector continue 
to walk away from financial meltdown with 
personal fortunes intact, public anger at 
perceived injustice has mounted. Whether 
or not banks and their staff deserve this 
reputation, in the post-crash economic 
winter there are few, if any, professions  
and institutions as universally reviled.
For Oliver and De Bruin, this poses a very 
serious problem. If citizens and businesses 
distrust banks, they say, a chilling effect will 
spread as economies slow, unemployment 
rises and companies and countries go bust. 
It’s already happening.
“If you talk to bankers, many will blame 
the public for not trusting them, either 
for a lack of financial understanding, or 
for an unwarranted cynicism encouraged 
by hostile portrayals in the media,” said 
De Bruin, “but this is a defensive ‘blame 
the consumer’ strategy – a form of denial. 
The decline in public trust tracks a decline 
in trustworthiness of the financial sector. 
Trustworthiness needs to be restored first. 
Trust will follow.”
In developing a theory of trustworthiness 
for banks, Oliver and De Bruin will navigate 
the various conflicting interests inherent in 
financial relationships – between depositors 
and borrowers, between bankers and 
shareholders, and so on – and will chart 
the complex kinds of interactions needed 
for successful and trustworthy financial 
services. To be trustworthy, one must 
be both able and willing to perform the 
relevant actions. That is why the research 
will address key questions of competence 
and motivation, both of individuals and  
of organisations.
As well as drawing on the expertise of 
colleagues in their departments, Oliver 
and De Bruin are working with a team of 
postdoctoral researchers and PhD students. 
The first to join was Dr Tom Simpson, who 
wrote his Cambridge PhD thesis on trust 
on the internet. He soon progressed to 
Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government, 
where he is now Associate Professor of 
Philosophy and Public Policy.
The current post-docs are Dr Anthony 
Booth, who works at Sussex University and 
has published widely on epistemology and 
the ethics of belief, and Dr Chris Thompson, 
who brings to his research in political 
philosophy several years experience in 
policy roles for the UK and New Zealand 
governments. The two PhD students are 
“Trust me, I’m a banker” 
Fred Lewsey on a major project on trust in banks
The ‘Trusting Banks’ project team: L-R: Chris Thompson, Jens van’t Klooster,  Photo: Craig French 
Alex Oliver, Marco Meyer, Boudewijn de Bruin and Anthony Booth.  
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both trained in philosophy and economics. 
Marco Meyer came to Cambridge via 
Bayreuth and Oxford, while Jens van’t 
Klooster has degrees from Amsterdam 
and Berlin.
 Using initial results, they designed a 
‘Philosophy in Business’ course for the 
MBA programmes at Cambridge’s Judge 
Business School, and they have run tailor-
made workshops with bankers, from 
trainees through to boards.
Banks are massively diverse corporate 
agents. Fine-grained distinctions can be 
made between retail and investment 
banking, for example, which are easily 
confl ated in the public mind. Not everyone 
who works for a bank is a ‘bankster’ driven 
by a ‘greed is good’ mentality, just as not 
every university staff  member is an ivory 
tower academic.
“Many bank branch employees are 
trying to serve communities, and are 
deeply disturbed by ‘bad apple’ bankers. 
But their customers tend to tar them 
with the same broad brush. It’s a good 
question why rogue doctors don’t have 
the same eff ect. Doctors always top the 
trust polls, while bankers are now in 
the gutter with tabloid journalists and 
politicians,” said Oliver.
Virtues, and how an organisation 
can embody them, are a cornerstone of 
the project. Connecting with cutting-
edge research on corporate entities and 
corporate decision-making in philosophy 
and social science, the project will examine 
how institutional structures can foster the 
virtues needed for trustworthiness, such as 
intellectual honesty and humility, open-
mindedness, curiosity and truthfulness.
“The solution can sometimes be as 
simple as putting the right people in 
the right place, but typically it is not that 
simple,” said De Bruin, “Organisational 
change may well be needed, such as 
rotational policies, in which employees are 
shifted around to maintain objectivity in 
their client relationships.”
Oliver and De Bruin are keen to 
emphasise that their work is not a simple 
one-way transfer of knowledge from 
academia to the ‘real world’. “Philosophers 
and economists have increased our 
understanding of ‘virtue management’, 
but there are still many open questions. 
Answering them requires collaboration 
not only with other disciplines, but also 
with the banking world itself. Sharing ideas 
with bankers often leads to reciprocal 
illumination, which benefi ts all parties.”
One of the project’s outcomes will 
be a ‘fi nancial citizenship’ initiative. 
Rather than try to teach people about 
complex fi nancial products, this will 
focus on empowering citizens through 
identifying virtues that help them cope 
with confl icting fi nancial information. A 
web-based interactive module will enable 
prospective clients to test whether they are 
critical and sober-minded enough to see 
through the marketing tricks used to sell 
fi nancial products.
“Where it once stood for cautious 
fi nancial advice and a fi rm handshake, 
the word ‘banker’ has become slang for 
a ‘greed merchant’ who gambles other 
people’s money in rigged games so they 
alone get rich,” said Oliver. “‘Trust me, I’m 
a banker!’ is now a well-worn joke. We 
want to investigate how it can be made 
good advice.”
A version of this article fi rst appeared 
in Research Horizons Issue 25 (2014) 





Keep up to date with new books available in print and digital format at  
www.cambridge.org/newphilosophy
Submit your research to the  
Journal of the American Philosophical Association
Launched in 2015, the Journal of the American 
Philosophical Association publishes compelling 
research written in a way that can be appreciated 
by philosophers of every persuasion. It welcomes 
submissions in all areas of philosophy.
To read the first volume, please visit:
journals.cambridge.org/apa
Visit our bookshop on Trinity Street and show your
University card for your exclusive 20% discount off books!
Biological Foundations of Bioethics
Tim Lewens
Much recent work on the ethics of new biomedical technologies is committed to 
hidden, contestable views about the nature of biological reality. This selection of 
essays by Tim Lewens explores and scrutinises these biological foundations, and 
includes work on human enhancement, synthetic biology, and justice in healthcare 
decision-making.
240 pages | January 2015 | Hardback | 978-0-19-871265-7 | £30.00
Tetralogue 
I’m Right You’re Wrong
Timothy Williamson
Four people with radically different views meet on a train and talk about what 
they believe. Each starts off convinced that he or she is right; then doubts creep 
in. Timothy Williamson uses a fictional conversation to explore the philosophical 
debate over whether one point of view can be right and the other wrong. He invites 
the reader to decide.
 160 pages | February 2015 | Hardback | 978-0-19-872888-7 | £10.99
The Robust Demands of the Good 
Ethics with Attachment Virtue and Respect
Phillip Pettit
Philip Pettit offers a new insight into moral psychology. He shows that attachments such as love, and 
certain virtues such as honesty, require their characteristic behaviours not only as things actually are, but 
also in cases where things are different from how they actually are. He explores the implications of this 
idea for key moral issues.
304 pages | May 2015 | Hardback | 978-0-19-873260-0 | £25.00
The Limits of Realism
Tim Button 
Tim Button explores the relationship between minds, words, and world. He argues 
that the two main strands of scepticism are deeply related and can be overcome, 
but that there is a limit to how much we can show. We must position ourselves 
somewhere between internal realism and external realism, and we cannot hope to 
say exactly where. 
280 pages | June 2015 | New in Paperback | 978-0-19-874412-2 | £19.99
Order online: oup.com/uk/philosophy
Follow @OUPPhilosophy on Twitter 1
Philosophy from Oxford
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Religious Belief
Arif Ahmed
In early 2014 Dr Daniel Weiss (Divinity 
Faculty) and I received a grant to run an 
Interdisciplinary Mellon Seminar on religious 
belief. The aim, at any rate my aim, was to 
learn from people of diverse religious and 
academic backgrounds just what role belief, 
for instance in divine revelation, miracles 
etc. plays in modern religion. You would 
have thought it was central: how could 
any Christian say with a straight face that 
the resurrection was a conjuring trick with 
bones, or any Muslim allow that Mohammed 
was deluded? And yet many sophisticated 
followers of religion think or say that religion 
centrally involves only ‘practices’ − what 
Wittgenstein called ‘forms of life’ − to which 
full-blown belief is incidental. But what are 
these practices? And what, to anyone who 
doesn’t believe, could possibly be their point?
These enquiries led us to a range of classic 
and little-known works from anthropology, 
apologetics, history and philosophy. The 
discussions, which were always lively, often 
started out by attempting to isolate what 
their writers had got right and what wrong; 
but frequently this was the occasion for 
members of the group to describe their 
own forms of religious life. So I learnt as 
much from the seminarians as from the 
texts. Although nothing altered my views 
concerning the value or truth of religion,  
I ended with a greater appreciation of the 
variety of attitudes to it that fall short of  
full-blown rejection.
In fact, the question we addressed in 
the first two seminars was not whether 
religious belief is necessary to religion, but 
what would justify such belief in the first 
place. This arose in the context of a famous 
exchange between W. K. Clifford and William 
James. In ‘The Ethics of Belief’, Clifford had 
argued that the proper determinant of belief 
is evidence: “It is wrong always, everywhere, 
and for anyone, to believe anything upon 
insufficient evidence.” 
This principle can look tautological, and 
yet it certainly is true that many people 
evaluate not only the expression of a belief, 
but also the holding of it, on grounds that 
have nothing to do with evidence. Consider 
the proposition that there is a causal 
connection between immigration and crime, 
or the proposition that one race is innately 
superior to another in some measurable 
respect. Many well-intentioned people find 
these thoughts distasteful and are for this 
reason reluctant to adopt them, or even to 
keep an open mind. But they are empirical 
propositions, and Clifford’s principle applies 
here if anywhere: we should not deny them 
unless the evidence supports doing so. 
Therefore Clifford’s principle cannot really  
be that obvious.
But what is obvious once we do 
appreciate it, is that it bites quite hard on 
religion. Most irreligious thinkers (most 
notably David Hume) and many religious 
ones (e.g. Kant, Kierkegaard and William 
James) agree that the evidence does not 
support any religious belief − at least, none 
that have anything like the content of those 
associated with the major religions. 
Christ Rises Triumphant by Fr Lawrence Lew CC BY-NC-ND 2.0  www.flickr.com/photos/paullew
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Hume argues most persuasively in this 
direction in Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion and in the last two chapters of 
the first Enquiry, chapter X of which is the 
famous essay on miracles. He argues that 
the testimony that constitutes our evidence 
of, say, the resurrection of Jesus was most 
probably misleading. For it must be agreed 
on all hands that resurrections are at best 
vanishingly rare. 
And it must similarly be agreed that 
deceitful or deluded testimony, particularly 
on matters of religion, is widespread − after 
all, Christians must agree that over 99% of 
world religions are founded by what C. S. 
Lewis called ‘lunatics or liars’. Therefore, we 
should be much more confident that the 
Gospel testimonies to miracles are false 
than that they are true. Clifford’s principle 
then tells us that we should all drop − if we 
ever held − the distinctive beliefs of the 
Christian religion, and similar points hold 
against all others. (Clifford himself applies 
an interesting variant on Hume’s argument 
against Mohammed’s testimony that he 
met an angel.)
This raises two questions: first, is evidence 
really necessary for religious belief? And 
second, is religious belief really necessary 
for religion? The first question brings us 
to William James, who argues in ‘The Will 
to Believe’ that on religious questions we 
should go beyond the evidence. Whether to 
believe or not is in James’s term a decision 
that is both forced and momentous, 
meaning that you must do one or the other, 
and it matters which. James now addresses 
Clifford: “If religion be true and the evidence 
for it still insufficient, I do not wish… to 
forfeit my sole chance in life of getting upon 
the winning side.” You might wonder why 
this doesn’t equally support any religion, 
and so strongly supports none. James might 
reply that Zoroastrianism, the Roman and 
Hellenic cults, Branch Dravidianism and the 
rest are for us dead options − that is, not 
really available for us to believe in the first 
place. Clifford responds that what killed 
them is what should kill modern Christianity 
and Islam too; and on the whole, despite 
James’s grave chiding, the proverbial 
schoolboy got things more right when he 
said “Faith is when you believe something 
that you know ain’t true.”
The second question was whether 
religious belief itself was necessary for any 
practice recognizable as religion. I was 
surprised to meet people who professed 
to be Christian but didn’t believe in the 
miraculous events surrounding the birth, 
life and death of Jesus. Some of the texts we 
examined helped to give an independent 
fix on whether this approach was historically 
or geographically widespread and whether 
it had philosophical support. 
Amongst the historical texts that we 
considered were discussions of ‘belief’, 
or rather expressions that are now so 
rendered in medieval sources. Here it 
became apparent that ‘belief in God’ meant 
more than mere intellectual assent to an 
existential proposition. Instead it signified  
an emotional engagement that was 
manifest in all aspects of medieval life. 
In a way that is hardly surprising: one 
would not after all have expected the 
Spanish Inquisition or the St Bartholomew’s 
day massacre from men whose religion 
was entirely dispassionate. But the lack of 
emphasis on intellectual assent seemed to 
me to illustrate not its absence from earlier 
forms of Christianity but rather its having 
been taken for granted in those earlier times, 
the entire Middle Ages having laboured 
under the great disadvantage of pre-dating 
the Enlightenment. 
Anthropological work on the Nuer 
people of South Sudan has highlighted 
the difficulties involved in the cross-cultural 
transposition of the notion of belief; for 
the attitude they take to religion is not 
incontestably of the same type as what 
we call ‘belief’. There is verbal adherence 
to a creed; there is the transmission of 
tribal myths; there is a feeling of reverence: 
but there is no unitary ‘inner’ state. That at 
least was the claim of Rodney Needham’s 
famous work Belief, Language and Experience. 
Indeed, Needham sought to expunge the 
very notion of belief from ethnography 
and comparative epistemology, because 
the more closely we examine it “the harder 
it is to concede it any discrete character or 
any empirical value as an index to the inner 
life of men.” The seminar was divided over 
the plausibility of Needham’s very radical 
critique of a category that has after all had 
enormous value in everyday life; also over 
quite what conclusions to draw from the 
disparity between his description of the 
Nuer and their descriptions of themselves, 
now handily available at nueronline.com.
The penultimate week covered a modern 
figure who figured largely in Needham’s 
work and in almost every other seminar: 
Wittgenstein. We read his conversations 
on religious belief alongside work by Kai 
Nielsen and D. Z. Philips. The broad outlines 
of Wittgenstein’s approach are well known. 
Religion functions as an autonomous 
‘language game’ or ‘form of life’. Judging its 
claims by standards of empirical enquiry 
is a sort of category mistake, like criticizing 
tennis because it violates the rules of 
cricket. Therefore, religious discourse is  
not subject to external standards − either 
you go in for it or you don’t. 
Nielsen objects that things must be more 
complicated because religious discourse 
uses words that occur elsewhere in our 
lives. And it presumably must be like that if 
religion is to comfort ordinary practitioners 
in the ways that they seek. Unless ‘the life 
of the world to come’ really means the life 
of the world to come in the ordinary sense 
of those words, how could the promise 
of it reconcile anyone to death? But these 
grounds for thinking Wittgenstein wrong 
are grounds for wishing he were right: if 
religion had been the world-historical game 
of Mornington Crescent that he seems to 
envisage, it would have done a lot less harm, 
as well as a lot less good, than it actually has. 
Arif Ahmed is a Senior Lecturer in  
the Faculty.
Joint sessions in Cambridge
In July 2014, Cambridge hosted the largest annual philosophy gatherings in the 
UK academic calendar: the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind 
Association; and the annual conferences for the British Society for the Philosophy  
of Science, and the British Society for Ethical Theory. 
Over 400 philosophers from across the world converged on Fitzwilliam College 
for seven days of conferences, during which more than 200 talks took place, on 
topics ranging from truth and meaning to moral testimony, from Kant and the paradox 
of knowability to reasons of love. For the first time, the inaugural addresses were 
recorded and are available here: http://sms.csx.cam.ac.uk/collection/1780470
Open access to Wittgenstein’s Nachlass
A project to produce a new high resolution facsimile of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass 
using the most up-to-date technology has been made possible through a 
partnership between the Wren Library at Trinity College, Cambridge, the 
Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen and the Stanhill Foundation.
The Nachlass consists of hundreds of separate manuscripts, typescripts, 
notebooks and other written material, totalling some 20,000 pages. The new 
facsimile will give free online access to Wittgenstein’s work as he wrote it, and 
without editing or intermediation and will be of immense benefit to Wittgenstein 
scholars. It is available from: www.wittgensteinsource.org.
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Staff news
Emeritus Professor Onora O’Neill was the 
winner of the Sir Isaiah Berlin Award for 
Lifetime Contribution to Political Studies.  
She also gave the 2014 Isaiah Berlin lecture 
at Oxford University.
Prof Alex Oliver was awarded a LittD for 
his work in logic and metaphysics.
Prof Rae Langton was elected a Fellow 
of the British Academy. She won the Mind 
Senior Research Fellowship for 2014/15,  
and will give the prestigious John Locke 
lectures at Oxford University this Summer. 
More information is available from:  
www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/john_
locke_lectures. 
Prof John Marenbon won a British 
Academy grant to promote ties between 
the Cambridge Faculty of Philosophy  
and the Philosophy Department at Peking 
University in China. It will involve exchange 
visits for philosophers to attend a workshop 
at both institutions during 2015.
Prof Huw Price and Dr  Seán Ó 
hÉigeartaigh (Executive Director, CSER) 
have contributed a case study to a report  
of the Government Chief Scientific 




Dr Tim Button was awarded a £100,000 
Philip Leverhulme Prize for outstanding 
scholarship. This will fund a 2-year research 
project, during which he will write a book 
on the way in which attitudes towards 
the self have influenced English speaking 
philosophy, during the 20th century.
Dr Louise Hanson’s paper ‘The Reality  
of (Non-Aesthetic) Artistic Value’  
Philosophical Quarterly 63 (2013), available  
at: http://philpapers.org/rec/HANTRO-14 
was recently chosen by AFB as one of 
the top five papers in aesthetics to be 
published in 2013. 
Dr Arif Ahmed took part in a special 
debate on “Does evidence undermine 
religion?” on BBC One’s “The Big Questions” 
on 18 January 2015.
Dr Angela Breitenbach has been  
awarded the first CRASSH Pro Futura 
Scientia Fellowship, to be held at the Centre 
for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and 
Humanities, and the Swedish Collegium for 
Advanced Study from 2015 to 2018. 
Dr Paulina Sliwa was awarded an early 
career fellowship for Lent 2016 to work  
on a project about praise, blame, and 
intentional action.
Dr Clare Chambers and Prof Rae Langton 
participated in the first Cambridge WOW 
(Women of the World) Festival which 
celebrated the achievements of women 
and girls worldwide.
Dr Tom Dougherty (University of Sydney) 
was appointed to a University Lectureship.
Dr Michael Gabbay joined the Faculty 
as a Research Fellow, funded by the 
International Federation of Computational 
Logic. 
Dr Will MacAskill was appointed as a 
Junior Research Fellow at Emmanuel 
College.
Appointments
We are delighted that a number of our recent 
graduates have been appointed to academic 
posts. Owen Griffiths has been appointed 
as a temporary Teaching Associate at 
Cambridge. Chris Cowie has a 3-year Junior 
Research Fellowship at Fitzwilliam College, 
Cambridge. Sebastian Nye has been 
appointed to a one-year Lecturer post at 
Keble College, Oxford. Neal Carrier has been 
appointed to teach Philosophy and Religious 
Studies at Hampton School, London.
Student Prizes
Luke Cash (St Edmund’s) was awarded 
the Matthew Buncombe prize for best 
overall achievement in the MPhil. The Craig 
Taylor prize for best performance in the 
Tripos went to Matthew van der Merwe 
(Gonville and Caius) for Part IB, and Michael 
Thorne (Peterhouse) for Part II.
Future Events
Routledge Lecture in Philosophy
15 June 2015
Sidgwick Hall, Newnham College
Prof Judith Jarvis Thompson (MIT) 




Dr Hermann Hauser, Dr Lucy Cheke 
and Dr Demis Hassabis will have 
‘A Conversation on the Future of 
Intelligence’ chaired by Prof Huw 
Price. Further details will be available 
from: www.alumni.cam.ac.uk. 
Cambridge Festival of Ideas 2015
20 October–2 November 2015
The University of Cambridge and 
the Arts and Humanities Research 
Council present a debate on 
‘Religion and Education: an Uneasy 
Partnership’. This debate is a part of 
the AHRC Anniversary Debates on 
‘The Way We Live Now’. Please see 
the Festival website: www.cam.ac.uk/
festival-of-ideas for further details.
Information about other forthcoming 
events is available from the Faculty 
website: www.phil.cam.ac.uk.
Dr Chris Cowie gave a talk 
on why philosophy matters 
to the Philosophical Society 
at RAF Lakenheath − home 
of the US Air Force 48th 
Fighter Wing. The Society, 
founded by Tech Sgt. Jason 
Harlan aims to develop the 
critical thinking skills of its 
airmen to enable them to 
better themselves, both in 
their jobs and in their day-
to-day lives. He commented 
that: “Philosophy is far from 
being a futile endeavor 
or something that has no 
real bearing on the world. 
It has real applicability in 
everyone’s life”. 
People
Tech Sgt. Jason Harlan (left) presenting Chris Cowie  
with a clock
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Philosophical ethics often focuses on the 
negative, on ‘thou shalt not’. It focuses 
on issues like abortion, euthanasia, or 
killing in war, in an attempt to mark the 
demarcation between the permissible and 
the impermissible. More rarely does it focus 
on the positive aspects of living a good life: 
on how individuals can use their time and 
money to make the world a better place; 
on issues like how one should spend one’s 
money, or which career one should choose. 
I think that’s a mistake. Of the students 
I’ve had the privilege to speak with at 
Cambridge and other universities, the most 
pressing ethical question they have is often 
not “How can I avoid acting impermissibly?” 
but instead, “How can I leave the world a 
better place than I found it?” 
The philosophical approach I’ve helped 
to develop is called effective altruism:  
the theory of how one can use one’s  
time and money to do the most good. 
Through my research I’ve discovered that 
many well-intentioned social programs 
achieve very little, but the most effective 
give each of us an extraordinary ability to 
make a difference. I’ve written up the ideas 
behind effective altruism into a book called 
Doing Good Better, which will be published 
this August.
Sometimes my research has led me to 
unexpected conclusions. I’ve concluded, for 
example, that altruistic graduates can often 
do more good by working in a lucrative 
career and donating a large proportion of 
their earnings (an approach I call earning 
to give), than by working directly for a 
charity. By earning to give, a graduate can 
often pay for the salaries of several charity 
workers; moreover, they can ensure that 
their donations only fund the very most 
cost-effective charities. Given how greatly 
charities vary in their effectiveness, this is a 
big deal.
Effective altruism is a practical movement 
as well as a philosophical one. In 2009 with 
Oxford philosopher Toby Ord I cofounded 
Giving What We Can (givingwhatwecan.
org), which encourages people to 
donate at least 10% of their earnings to 
the most cost-effective charities, and 
provides recommendations about which 
development charities do the most good 
with every pound or dollar they receive. In 
2011, with philosophy and physics graduate 
Ben Todd, I cofounded 80,000 Hours 
(80000hours.org), which advises young 
people on how they can have the biggest 
social impact with their careers. (The name 
refers to the number of hours you’ll typically 
work in life.) In the late 2000s, two hedge 
fund analysts quit their jobs to found 
GiveWell, based in San Francisco, which 
undertakes in-depth charity evaluation 
based on effective altruist principles, and 
advises the foundation Good Ventures.
We’ve seen a remarkable uptake in 
these ideas. Giving What We Can now has 
almost 1,000 members, raising $14 million 
in donations for the most cost-effective 
charities, with a further $380 million in 
lifetime pledges. 80,000 Hours has advised 
hundreds of people round the world who 
are now pursuing careers with the aim of 
maximizing their social impact, in areas as 
diverse as research, politics, finance and 
entrepreneurship. New effective altruism 
aligned organisations are being set up 
every year. And there is now a vibrant 
community, with people who identify with 
effective altruism supporting each other 
and helping each other be more successful 
in making the world a better place. 
William MacAskill (Jesus 2008) is a 
Junior Research Fellow at Emmanuel 
College.
965 members in 17 countries
$388 million pledged
$7 million donated
85k amount that a typical person 
in the UK could donate in their 
lifetime
The 14 Students Giving 
Away £3 Million
Matthew van der Merwe
14 current and former Cambridge 
Philosophy students have signed the 
Giving What We Can pledge to donate 
10% of their lifetime income to the 
charities they believe will do the  
most good. Conservatively, this 
amounts to an estimated £3 million  
in donations pledged by the Faculty’s 
undergraduates. Giving What We Can 
encourages people to donate 10%  
of their income through their pledge, 
and performs research into which 
charities achieve the most good for  
a given donation. 
Since 2011, Giving What We Can  
has had a presence in Cambridge.  
This has grown substantially, mirroring 
that of the organization as a whole. 
Remarkably, 80 students have  
so far signed the pledge. More 
remarkable still, is the fact that  
despite representing only 1 in  
100 Cambridge undergraduates, 
philosophy students represent 1 in  
6 Cambridge pledgers. 
This is explained to some extent  
by social factors, since many of the 
early organizers of the Cambridge 
student group were philosophers. 
However, I think that further 
explanation lies in the fact that 
philosophy students are broadly  
more open to hearing new arguments, 
and more concerned with acting 
consistently with their beliefs than 
those in other subjects. Consequently, 
these students are both more likely  
to be persuaded by the arguments  
in favour of making this sort of 
commitment, and more likely to  
make it having decided it is the right 
thing to do.
This phenomenon should be a 
source of pride for Philosophy at 
Cambridge. For a discipline often 
criticized for its focus on problems  
far removed from the practical, it is 
producing an impressive number  
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Richard Baron has a passion for philosophy. 
He is an independent researcher; he is a 
former teacher and a current public speaker 
on the subject. But more than this, he is also 
a patron of the discipline. He has donated to 
the Faculty in support of the Bertrand Russell 
Chair. And recently, he decided to leave a gift 
to the Faculty in the form of a legacy.
 Richard’s interests are many and 
varied. An accountant by training, he 
had a 30-year career in tax accountancy 
and policy, but now devotes his time to 
matters philosophical (and occasionally, 
poetical). He has written on mind, values, 
and epistemology. He has also taught 
in adult education on topics ranging 
from the Nicomachean Ethics to Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems.
It’s certainly not your average career 
path. But Richard seems to delight in his 
philosophical activities. “I have a kind of 
fascination with problem solving− with 
puzzles,” he professes, one that he’s 
harboured for most of his life. 
His first run-in with philosophy was at 
the tender age of twelve when he chanced 
upon Bertrand Russell’s obituary in The 
Times. The article mentioned Russell’s 
account of definite descriptions, and it was 
this most technical puzzle that piqued the 
young Richard’s interest. “There was just 
some little light bulb that went on inside; I 
thought ‘This matters.’” 
Philosophical puzzles have a deep 
relevance to us, he explains. They help us 
to better understand ourselves. And while 
it’s true that they are puzzles anyone can 
ponder, he feels it is important that they 
continue to be studied by the world-class 
academics at Cambridge. “These are puzzles 
that matter. Therefore it matters that we 
have steady input into solving them. And 
it matters that we have high quality input 
into solving them.” 
Richard’s respect for and commitment 
to the integrity of the field is never far from 
the surface. Indeed it is even apparent in 
the way he recounts his undergraduate 
experience. As a student at Selwyn, he read 
philosophy and history. He recalls his time 
here with obvious fondness, and tells of the 
thrill that came with learning from those 
at the top of their field. Today, some 30 
years later, his sense of excitement remains. 
He remarks: “This stuff [contemporary 
academic philosophy] is the real McCoy; 
it gives those of us working outside 
universities something to think about, and 
sets a standard which we jolly well ought 
to meet.”
This commitment to preserving 
philosophy’s place in universities is part 
and parcel of his sense of philosophy’s 
importance more generally. Richard 
devotes much of his time to public 
speaking engagements. He describes  
how rewarding it is to discuss philosophical 
matters with people from different academic 
and professional backgrounds. “The groups 
are comprised of intelligent people with 
a wide range of skills,” he explains, “In the 
question and answer sessions, they can 
make you think quite hard.”
But, even in light of such a level of 
dedication to philosophy, why support 
Cambridge philosophy by way of a legacy 
in particular? “Legacies have the great 
advantage that you’re not going to need 
the money yourself,” he jokes. He notes 
some of the tax-related practicalities − 
there is no inheritance tax on legacies,  
he explains. 
But most important to him is the desire 
to preserve and support a discipline that  
he loves:
“Philosophy opened up new horizons  
for those of us who had the chance to 
study at Cambridge, and it influenced  
our way of looking at the world and  
society, in ways that we may or may not 
have noticed. It is worth doing our bit to 
make sure that the discipline does not 
merely survive, but flourishes, for the sake 
of current and future students.” 
Richard Baron (Selwyn 1977) is an 
independent researcher in philosophy. 
He has given a number of public 
lectures and seminars on philosophy, 
and is an organiser of Philosophy For 
All. His personal website is available 
at: www.rbphilo.com. Richard was 
interviewed by Shyane Siriwardena,  
a PhD student in the Faculty.
Richard Baron on Giving Back to Philosophy
Shyane Siriwardena
Your comments and contributions are 
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